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SARA SHNEI DERMAN DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY CoRNELL UNIVERSITY 
VIOLENT H ISTORI ES AND PoLITICAL CoNSCIOUSNEss: 
REFLECTIONS ON NEPAL's MAoiST MovEMENT FROM 
PISKAR V 1LLAGE 1 
This paper considers th e links between the 1\<[aoist movement and past histo ries of political violence 
in rural Nepal. I ex plore how a 1984 police ma ssac re of village rs in Piska r, Sindhupalcok , fostered 
local politica l consciousness, whi ch later became esse ntial to the Maoist movement's ability to moti -
va te participants at the grassro o ts leve l. Most obse rvers of the ea rly phases of the Maoist movement 
in Ne pal trea ted it either as an incomprehensible , anomalous rupture in a generally peaceful politi -
ca l field, or as a case of political party split s gone aw ry. I argue in stead th at the tvlaoist insurrection 
is dee pl y embedd ed in Ne pal's violent hi sto ry of state formation and is a co ntemp orary manifes ta-
tion of the long-ter m inte rplay between politi cs and co nsciousness crea ted by that hi story. In order 
to understand the movement's tenacity, particularly in an ostensibly post-Communist world order, 
we mus t address th e question of motivation on the part of those who have fo rm ed its rank and file , 
and examine the historical conditions that presaged their participation. In order to do this, I draw 
upon the theories of Antonio Gramsc i to consider Nepal 's current situation a "crisis of hegemony", 
as well as upon ethnographic and histo rica l material from my own resea rch in the Pi skar area. 
In evuy COillltry the process is diffeJ·ent, althottglt the content is the sa111e. And th e co11tent 
is the crisis of the ruli11g class 's hege HJOIIy, which occ!lrs either beca11se tlte 1·uling class has 
fniled in so111e 111ajor politiwliindataliillg . .. or bew11se lt11ge mnsses ... ltnve pnssed sud-
denly fro11J a state of politiwl passivity to a certain activity, m1d p11tfonvard demands whiclt 
tal1en together, albeit not organically for1111tlat ed, add 11p to a revol11tion. A 'crisis of author-
ity ' is spolien of: this is precisely tlte crisis of ltege111ony, or crisis of tlt e state as a wltole. 
-Antonio Gramsci (as cited in Forgacs 2000: 218) 
INTRODUCTION 
Most observers of the early phases of the Maoist 
movement in Nepal initially treated it either as an 
incomprehensible, anomalous rupture in a generally 
peaceful political field, or as a case of political party 
splits gone awry2 Absent from these discussions is 
any substantive consideration of the roles rural resi-
dents have played in the rebellion 3 I argue instead 
that the Maoist insurrection is deeply embedded in 
Nepal's violent history of state formation and is a 
contemporary manifestation of the long-term inter-
play between politics and consciousness created by 
that history. In order to understand the movement's 
tenacity, particularly in an ostensibly post-Commu-
nist world order, we must address the question of 
ni.otivation on the part of those who have formed its 
rank and file, and examine the historical conditions 
that presaged their participation . 
Antonio Gramsci's analyses of societies in political 
crisis provide an insightful set of conceptual tools to 
guide our enquiries of the Nepali situation. Gramsci 
was the leader of the Italian Communist Party from 
1924-26, when he was arrested and imprisoned un-
til 1937. He was released just in time to die from 
a disease he had contracted in prison, but during 
his incarceration he had several inOuential insights 
for Marxist theory, which he recorded in notebooks 
that were eventually published posthumously. He at-
tempted to transcend traditional1'[arxism's economic 
determinism, which gave primacy to economic pro-
duction and treated political and cultural discourse, 
as well as personal consciousness, as dependent 
"superstructure" that adjusts to changes in economic 
production systems. While still recognizing the im-
portance of historical conditions, Gramsci focused 
on the active role social, cultural, and political dis-
courses play on the ideological level to inOuence 
individual consciousness, control social groups, and 
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thereby consolidate the power of dominant classes. Spending 
several years in prison for his political beliefs , Gramsci devel-
oped the key concept of "hegemony." The term has since been 
used widely, although imprecisely (Kurtz 1996), to mean the 
set of ideas and assumptions promoted by a dominant group. 
Gramsci 's definition was more complex: hegemonic discourse 
was not limited only to the strategies used by those already 
in povver to justify their rule, it could also characterize the 
ideological strategies dissidents employed to justify an alter-
native vision of society. Hegemony also implies the successful 
alliance of diverse social groups and classes to effect change. 
Broadly defined, Gramsci's 
approach acknowledges 
the importance of the his-
torical parameters which 
limit the the develop-
ment of individual politi-
cal consciousness, while 
recognizing that political 
consciousness is simulta-
neously mediated through 
culture and transformed 
on the level of individual 
practice and agency4 
I consider Nepal's cur-
rent situation a "crisis of 
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hegemony" because all three of Gramsci's conditions for such 
a crisis have been met: "a crisis at the top, one of political and 
party representation; a serious economic situation . ; and 
a crisis 'at the base,' marked by the entry of the masses on to 
the historical stage and their ability to organize themselves 
and lead a process of alliances ."5 In this paper l focus on the 
third point: the formation of political actors at the "base" lev-
el. Gramsci's concept of "practical ideology," which describes 
the way in which hegemonic discourse is understood by com-
mon people through the idiom of economy and production, is 
central to this endeavor. 
Since I aim to outline the conditions of consciousness that 
have led to individual participation in the Maoist movement, 
my account of the crisis of hegemony in Nepal is inherently 
ethnographic and local. Part of why it took so long for schol-
ars to recognize the gravity of Nepal's political situation was 
because the "regional ethnography traditions"6 in Nepal have 
focused on describing small-scale village-based co~munities 
at the expense of examining state structures7 Early attempts 
to address this bias in analyses of the 1v1aoist movement 
stepped too far to the other side,_ seeking to explain the re-
volt primarily in terms of state and -party-level dynamics. 
My intention is to steer a middle course ~hat both focuses 
on local experience, and situates it in the broader framework 
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of national processes . Such an analysis must also have an 
historical aspect which can, in james Scott's words, provide 
the long-term background of "slow, grinding, quiet struggle 
over rents, crops, labor and taxes"8 that underlies any explo-
sive revolutionary movement. Indeed, in the Nepali context, 
"what is missing from the picture of the periodic explosions 
is the underlying vision of justice that informs them and their 
specific goals and targets, which are often quite rational in-
deed"9 
My own small contribution to this larger ethnographic proj-
ect focuses on political 
violence and resistance in 
Map of the Thangml area in northeast Nepal the ethnically Thangmi 
village of Piskar, in the 
Sindhupalcok district of 
northeastern Nepal. 10 
Piskar was the site of a 
1984 massacre by police 
forces after villagers al-
legedly protested against 
the state-supported ex-
ploitative policies of local 
landlords. lt provides a 
specific microcosmic ex-
ample of the development 
of village level political 
consciousness in relation to regional and national events. 
At the same time, the narrative from Piskar presented here 
should not be reified as the master narrative for all of Ne-
pal; instead, it should be seen as a first step towards collect-
ing diverse, and even conflicting, narratives from across the 
country during different historical phases in an effort to piece 
together the full story. 
Detailed information on daily life in Maoist-affected rural 
Nepal has been hard to obtain, and the account presented 
here is the result of accidental providence rather than explicit 
ethnographic intention. From 1998-2000, I was resident in 
Nepal as a Fulbright scholar, conducting research on the eth-
nohistory and ritual practice of the Thangmi ethnic group of 
Dolakha and Sindhupalcok districts. During the course of my 
research, the Maoists began to build their 'base areas' in these 
two districts, and I unwittingly came in contact with both 
their agents and their ideology. Only after the fact did I real-
ize that I had witnessed a crucial moment in the formation 
of local political consciousness as I watched my close friends 
and collaborators first become aware of the Maoist project 
and then consider its implications. 11 My research on the Mao-
ist movement, then, is a sort of "accidental anthropology." 12 
My local relationships were pre-determined by my previous 
residence in the area, and my perspective on the unfolding 
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poli tica l situation was shaped by my ongoing fieldwork in the 
Thangmi community. Furt hermore, the histor ical documents 
on which thi s paper d raws all or iginate from Thangmi cul-
l ural committees. lvly bias towards Thangmi vi llagers' experi-
ence of the situation natu rally colors my analysis here. The 
next step in understanding Piskar 's history will be unearth-
ing the official hi stories or the same events, and pairing them 
wi th the Thangmi accounts to create a more complete picture 
of the unfolding cri sis at both the local and state level. 
TI-lE ARGUMENT FOR FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS 
The focus on ethnographic detail is particularly urgent be-
cause most ana lyses of the lv!aoist movement in Nepal have 
focused on the other two aspects of a Gramscian. crisis: the 
breakclovvn of political legitimacy on the part of the ruling 
parties at the top and the economic problems of poverty and 
poor development. 13 A !though these are both key pieces of 
the puzz le, they alone can not explai n the political chaos that 
Nepa l has experienced over the last several years. The miss-
ing piece lies in the third component of Gramsci's crisis: the 
process of consciousness formation among individuals. For a 
number of reasons this crucial element was largely ignored 
in initi al analyses. 14 Instead, Nepalis who participated in the 
lvlaoist movement were often represented as victims of a sort 
of false consciousness, or worse, of no consciousness at all. 
The assumption of false consciousness was linked to a general 
sense of disbe lief that, for some individuals, participation in 
the Maoist movement may have been a conscious decision, 
although the speci fi e forms of disbelief prevalent among the 
Western scholarly and aiel communities, and the Nepali elite 
commentators were different. 
The follo wing three citations from \Vestern observers with 
extensive expe rience in Nepal-the first an anthropologist, 
the second a journalist , and the third a participant in an email 
discussion group- demonstrate how the assumption of false 
consciousness slipped into even the most engaged and other-
wise effect ive analyses. 
.How have rural people reac ted to the campaigns of politi-
cisation originating in the towns? How is it that they have 
found themselves involved in , and how have they allovved 
themselves to be dragged into, fata l combat? 15 
One would think this sort of Stalinoid cant had long ago 
been rendered obsolete, but the gr imly familiar 20th cen-
tury phenomenon of socialist zea lots who justify a reformist 
agenda with a rigid ideology-and enforce it with psychotic 
brutality-is spreading like a virus through this fragile Hi-
malayan nation, raising a threat to the delicate i·egional bal-
ance of power. 16 . 
The government's abuse of human rights-disappearances, 
illegal detention , torture-is abhorrent. But the main relief 
that l believe the poor people of Nepal are looking for, right 
now, is an end to the rebellion that, being carried out suppos-
edly in their name, has left them hungry, terrified, and even 
more oppressed than they were before .17 
These writers all draw attention to important dimensions 
of the conflict by emphasizing the grim reality that many 
non-aligned villagers face. 18 However, their approaches do 
not adequately address those individuals who have actively 
chosen to participate, and instead cast all local people as pas-
sive participants in the movement, who are "dragged" into 
it or subsumed in its viral spread. Specific examples such as 
these indicate the broader tendency on the part of Western 
scholars , aiel workers, and observers to seek out explanations 
that would forestall the unpleasant realization that 'peaceful' 
Nepali villagers were also capable of extreme violence and 
murder. 
For the Nepali elite, acknowledging participation in the 
Maoist movement as a rational decision on the part of many 
of its members would have required recognition of the in-
surgents' potential to claim power at the state level. As long 
as Maoist supporters were portrayed as uneducated villag-
ers who did not understand the Maoists' true intentions, 
the movement's success could be portrayed as an accident 
that would come to an end as soon as the villagers in ques-
tion could be shaken out of their false consciousness. Fur-
thermore, an elitist form of nationalism made it difficult for 
many city dwellers to believe that such a violent movement 
could actually be orchestrated by their own countrymen, 
that Nepalis could commit such acts of violence against Ne-
palis. Rumors circulating in the Nepali press that numerous 
Maoist bodies recovered by security forces were very tall and 
dark-both physical features that would suggest the fighters 
were not in fact Nepali-point to this particular form of dis-
belief. Claiming that the Maoists were non-Nepali mercenar-
ies was structurally equivalent to claiming that the Maoists 
were Nepali victims of false consciousness. Either way, they 
were not agents acting in the conscious interest of the Nepali 
nation. Whatever the structure of disbelief, the category of 
false consciousness provided an easy way out for both Nepali 
and Western observers to avoid thinking of rural Nepalis as 
political agents, Maoist or otherwise. 
Although it is clear that many, and perhaps most, villagers 
have been unwillingly caught in the crossfire of the current 
conflict , as judith Pettigrew has shown, 19 others have actively 
participated in the Maoist movement, and it is these activists 
who are at the crux of this article. The large number of Mao-
ists involved in several attacks just before the 2001 Emergen-
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cy was imposed showed without a doubt that thousands of 
Nepalis were indeed actively participating in the movement. 
'vVhile there are no reliable statistics for that time, more re-
cent estimates of the Maoist People's Liberation Army suggest 
that in early 2003 there were 11,000 combatant fighters, with 
a support base of approximately 20,000 local militia mem-
bers20 Army and militia members are only one portion of 
the total number of individuals who have participated in the 
movement in some way. Participants have ranged from sym-
pathizers who provide food and lodging, through non-com-
batant local-level informers, armed militia men or women, to 
regional commanders. As has often been argued, many may 
have participated out of fear, but that is not the whole story. 
The proclamation of a jan sarkar (People's Government) at 
Rakhe Danda, Dolakha district, on july 23, 2001, is a case in 
point. According to numerous independent estimates, includ-
ing one by a British reporter, 10,000-15,000 locals attended 
the meeting at which the jan sarkar was announced 21 For 
an area not stereotypically thought of as a Maoist base up 
until that time, where the largest religious festivals rarely at-
tracted even 5,000 people, 
this number is significant. 
I assert that 5,000 people 
do not attend a meeting 
purely out of fear. In or-
der to understand why 
the Maoist movement 
succeeded in gaining so 
much ground in Nepal, it 
is necessary to establish 
who the people attending 
meetings like the one at 
Rakhe Danda were, and 
why they participated22 
VIOLENT HISTORIES 
Understanding the mo-
tivation behind mass participation in the Maoist movement 
requires a detailed investigation of the history of state-propa-
gated violence and oppression in Nepal, as well as the resis-
tance to it. The myth of a peaceful Nepal is precisely that-a 
myth. 
It is now well known that the violent police rampages dur-
ing the so-called "Operation Romeo" in the far-Western dis-
trict of Rolpa in 1995, and "Operation Kilo Sierra" carried out 
in 18 districts in 1998, generated rural anger and discontent 
which in turn fuelled the early phases of the Maoist move-
ment. To quote Deepak Thapa: 
The pain and suffering that the brutal police action left in 
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its wake vvould have provided the long-lasting motive energy 
for rhe Maoist insurgency, and it is on the foundations of the 
angered peasantry targeted by the police that the insurgents 
have been able to build the larger edifice of the People's War 
of today. 23 
Working from this premise, I suggest that by examining 
earlier instances of state repression such as the Piskar Mas-
sacre that I describe below, we can begin to identify the social 
conditions which led to the development of the specific politi-
cal consciousness, on which the Maoist movement later capi-
talized. Building upon the documentation that now exists for 
Rolpa and other Maoist strongholds in western Nepal, a more 
complete history of violence entails looking to other parts of 
the country in order to understand the broad parameters of 
the anger Thapa describes 24 
THE PISKAR CASE 
Piskar has a majority Thangmi ethnic population, and a 
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sizeable Brahmin/Chetri commu-
nity. Through the course of my 
own research on Thangmi reli-
gion, culture, and identity, I be-
came aware of a particular event in 
the history of Piskar village which 
shaped the political consciousness 
of the entire area, and was in part 
responsible for making Piskar a 
Maoist stronghold some years lat-
er. This event was the 1984 Piskar 
hatyakand, or massacre, in which 
seven villagers were killed by po-
lice forces and many more injured 
and arrested. 
By looking back to 1984, and 
tracing the subsequent develop-
ment of political consciousness in this area, we can see how 
Maoist ideological arguments, particularly in their early 
incarnations, made a certain amount of pragmatic sense to 
many of Piskar's inhabitants. Once this history is acknowl-
edged, participation in the Maoist movement for some of 
those involved may be understood as a logical reaction to ear-
lier experiences of state violence and oppression rather than 
as an anomalous break precipitated by outside forces beyond 
their comprehension or control. Understanding this manner 
of motivation in greater depth requires tracing the histori-
cal trajectories of frustration, rage, and resistance as they are 
refracted through memory to become relevant categories in 
our analysis of the contemporary situation. As the Piskar ex-
ample shows, the Maoist movement may have been in part a 
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calcu lated response to generations of state violence, a fOrm of 
resistance actively and willingly participated in by those who 
had ex hausted all other means. 
As recounted in publications of the va rious Thangmi cul-
tural committees25 and by Amnesty lnternational,26 the ba-
sic. storyline of the Piskar lvlassacre runs as follows. On the 
festi va l day of ~11aghe Sankranti (the first clay of the month 
of Magh) of v. s. 2040 (January 15, 1984), around 2,000 vil-
lagers from Piskar and the surrounding area gathered at the 
Pi skar lvlahadevsthan, a local temple, for their annual jatra, or 
cultural festival. The program included songs and skits which 
criticized local landowners and advocated just treatment 
of the poor. 'vVith the help of the Chief District Officer, the 
District Superintendent of Police, and the wealthiest regional 
landowner, Devi jang Pandey, local police forces surrounded 
the festival and opened fire. Bir Bahadur Thami and lie Thami 
were instantly killed , and were quickly anointed martyrs in 
Thangmi tellings of the story. Five other wounded villagers 
died soon thereafter , while fifteen sustained serious injuries. 
Numerous arrests were made on the clay of the jatra, and a 
wide-ranging police dragnet in the aftermath arrested many 
others on the charge of being present at the event. Many of 
those arrested spent upwards of three years in jail without 
trial. Some years later, Piskar residents finally lodged a formal 
complaint with the central government , then led by Prime 
Minister Lok Bahadur Chancl 27 Promises of compensation 
were made, but nothing was ever paid. 
SPONTANEITY AND CONSCIOUS LEADERSHIP 
Cultural performance and religious ritual have long been 
understood as primary arenas for political expression in rural 
Nepal. 28 From this perspective, it would be unsurprising if 
the Piskar jatra had an explicitly political agenda, regardless 
of who initiated it, or upon which particular ideological lines 
it was constructed . The Amnesty and INSEC reports on the 
incident suggest that the politically con tentious aspects of the 
1984 Piskar festival may have been the result of intervention 
from outside political agitators29 As the Amnesty report ex-
pl ains, "The authorities of the Piskar area are understood to 
have been concerned for some time about the infiuence and 
activities of radical groups who ... were 'defaming' local land-
owners."30 However, Thangmi-authored descriptions present 
the festiva l as a genuinely loca l event evolving out of. long-
term frust ration: "From the yea r 2037 v.s . [1981] onwards, in 
[the area] the people's di scontent against the exploiters had 
begun growing quickly. The suffering village community was 
becoming conscious of their own fundamental rights and 
welfare ."31 ln fact , I would argue that the festival itself, as well 
as Piskar's ensuing political evolution, was a perfec t example 
of the marriage of mass "spontaneity" and "conscious leader-
ship," in Gramscian terms32 
l should emphas ize here that members of the Thangmi eth -
nic group often portray themselves as victims of oppress ion at 
the hands of Hindu landowners, and that a large corpus of in-
digenous Thangmi songs, poetry, and stories articulates these 
issues and call for justice. To give some em pi rica] weight to 
the generally perceived Thangmi sense of injustice, it is worth 
citing the available 1999 statistics on property ownership in 
a neighboring VDC with a comparable Thangmi population 
(unfortunately statistics from Piskar are not available). \iVhile 
Thangmi constitute 90% of the population, 75% of Thangmi 
villagers owned only 0-5 ropani of land, and no Thangmi 
landholder owned over 20 ropani 33 In contrast , 67% of Brah-
min/Chetri villagers owned over 20 ropani of land and none 
owned less than 5 ropani 34 The Thangmi sen se of inequality 
is exacerbated by the fact that Brahmin/Chetri families set-
tled in the area within remembered history, and that in many 
cases these newcomers procured land previously owned by 
Thangmi through corrupt money-lending practices. 
From this perspective, it is not surpri sing that the Piskar 
festival may have included songs critical of large regional 
landowners. just as many commentators now argue that the 
Maoist movement is a result of loca l misunderstandings of 
imported political ideology that have no bearing on their 
' real' situation, one could argue that the Piskar jatra itself was 
a product of imported political ideology. lt may have been the 
relatively mainstream Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-
Leninist) rather than the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
that was propagating the radical new ideas then , but in just 
the same way villagers were simply suckered into participat-
ing in a staged event that hurt rather than helped their ovvn 
cause. l do not believe that thi s is a correct reading of the 
situation. Instead, l see the structural shape of local involve-
ment in the Piskar jatra as foreshadowing the later form of 
participation in the Maoist movement. ln other words, at the 
time of the Piskar Massacre, loca l tensions were already run-
ning high: the long-standing sense of exploitation was begin-
ning to be articulated, and when Communist party members 
agitating for democracy arrived in the village, their demands 
for universal franchise and the right to protest matched well 
with long term loca l concerns. 
This is not to discount the important role played by Pis-
kar residents that Gramsci might term "organic intellectuals." 
"Organic intellectuals are agents who tend to represent and 
direct the interest of subaltern populations who are being 
exploited and to provide them with a counter-hegemony to 
resist their exploitation"35 Here we see a small group of "or-
ganic intellectuals"-in this case loca l elites who had access 
to education in urban centers that Thangmi did not-return-
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ing to the area equipped with newly-learned Communist ide-
ology. In this way, we can see that those portrayed as outside 
agitators in some reports were in fact local 'organic intellectu-
als' who originated from the area. Their ideas, particularly 
of land reform and political povver for the disenfranchised, 
struck a chord with Thangmi villagers' existing grievances. 
One of the Thangmi writings on the Piskar events tells of long 
evenings in covert caves and candlelit rooms where returned 
local high-caste individuals such as Amrit Bohara and Mad-
hav Paudel explained the intricacies of Communist ideology 
to Thangmi farmers, who in turn excitedly explained how 
such ideas applied to their own situation. 36 Thus they began 
to dream of a shared revolution. 
COMPETING NATIONAL HEGEMONIES 
The same match between ideology and local agendas oc-
curred again, fifteen years later, when the Maoists first ar-
rived. Given the growing frustration with the lack of delivery 
of the promised democracy and the sense of exclusion from 
its benefits felt by many Piskar villagers, Maoist demands 
made even more sense than those which had been voiced by 
the earlier Communist democracy activists . As one villager 
from the region summarized the situation: 
ln Nepal, democracy has only come to people in the towns 
and district headquarters and then only to those with loud 
voices. ln the villages and remote areas, people have no idea 
what democracy is or how it should feel. How can they know? 
Even though it eventually reached the villages, the Movement 
for the Restoration of Democracy was something that started 
in Kathmandu and spread outwards. But the Maoist move-
ment is exactly the opposite: it started in the villages37 
This statement highlights the conflicting notions of nation-
al hegemony perceived to be held by the state and the Mao-
ists respectively. The ostensibly democratic state was viewed 
by villagers in Piskar as alienated from the aspirations and 
needs of rural individuals , while conversely the Maoists were 
felt to be attentive to those same concerns. The sentiments 
expressed here imply that whichever force-state or Mao-
ist-focused more earnestly on rural needs would gain the 
local support essential to any attempt to establish hegemonic 
power at the center. 
Continuing on this theme, in a version of the Pisbr story 
published by a politically centrist Thangmi cultural commit-
tee, the two Thangmi 'martyrs' from the village are initially 
represented as sacrificing their lives in the interest of national 
democracy. By the end of the polemic, however, a clear sense 
of frustration emerges with the central government's refusal to 
acknowledge their contribution to the democratic struggle. At 
44 
the outsel, the martyr Bir Bahadur is described as a "poor vil-
lage boy, fiercely defending himself against the enemy, [who] 
proudly sacrifi ced his life for his country as a true national-
ist»38 The closing sentence of the article, however, poses the 
question, "Isn't it an insult that the country has hesitated to 
put the names of these heroes who sacrificed their lives for 
democracy on the list of national martyrs?"39 While democ-
racy vvas the ideology of choice for as long as it appeared to 
promise positive change in villagers' lives, when the demo-
cratic system failed the very villagers who had fought for it, 
the space was open for another alternative-Maoism. 
A quotation from another, more radical Thangmi publica-
tion from 1997 drives this point home: "Was the intention of 
these patriots [the Piskar martyrs] to establish a multi-party 
system instead of the Panchayat? Why then are the same old 
leeches sucking the poor dry7 This is absolutely wrong, so 
to fulfil the lack of representation in the common interest, 
in the coming days we will definitely see the blood of the 
people of Piskar people flow again ."40 The emphasis here is 
on an alternative nationalism, one that recognizes the value 
of indigenous participation and local sacrifice. By proposing 
a counter-hegemonic national vision where indigenous needs 
and local sacrifices are honored , the Maoists cleverly deployed 
the symbol of the Nepali nation to take advantage of existing 
local sentiments. 
THE RHETORIC OF MAOIST VIOLENCE 
This question of Maoist violence remains . Even if we accept 
that villagers were repeatedly disappointed by the political 
process and were seeking another alternative, how do we ac-
count for their choice of the violent Maoist approach rather 
than that of the mainstream Communist parties? Answering 
this question requires an acknowledgement that violence is not 
a new phenomenon within Nepali politics; there is no radical 
break between the state-sponsored violence experienced by 
villagers as part of the Piskar Massacre, and the more recent 
forms of Maoist violence. Instead we have a slowly unfolding 
crisis of hegemony, the seeds of which vvere planted long ago. 
By refocusing on the history of violence which the villagers 
of Piskar experienced, it is easier to understand why an ide-
ology that encourages and even legitimizes violence against 
people Thangmi publications term "feudali sts" and "exploit-
ers" might become popular. lt is telling that the first act of 
violence in the area ascribed to the 1vlaoists was the murder 
of Devi jang Pandey, the same wealthy landowner who was 
complicit in organising the police response to the Piskar ja-
tra. Even villagers generally skeptical of the Maoist movement 
failed to find fault with this action, and 1v!aoist violence was 
thus affirmed. 
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From the perspective of many Piskar residents, their major 
sac rifice in the national interest had already been made in 
1984 when their fellovv villagers were killed , and the rheto-
ric of martyrdom that developed out of those events made it 
much easier to make similar sacr ifices again. The notion of 
martyrdom is central to the Maoist platform, as sho·wn by 
their demand #17: "People who died during the time of the 
movement should be declared as martyrs, and their fami-
lies and those who have been wounded and disabled should 
be given proper compensation."41 The Maoist emphasis on 
martyrdom creates a source of symbolic capital which le-
gitimi zes and even encourages violent actions on the part of 
its participants, just as martyrdom does for suicide-bombers 
elsewhere in the world. From this perspective, such actions 
can be understood as the result of 
choices made by individuals acting 
consciously within a logical frame-
work to overthrovv one hegemonic 
order and test another. 
In the end, regardless of whether 
the politicization of the Piskar ja-
tra was the result of a growing 
indigenous political consciousness 
or of outside agitation, the state 
response- seven dead, fifteen 
wounded, and hundreds of locals 
arrested and tortured or disappeared-affected everyone in 
the region and undoubtedly accelerated the development of a 
critical political consciousness. Indeed , hundreds of villagers 
who had not even been present at the jatra itself but were 
suspected of having leftist political sentiments were arrested, 
and some spent up to three years in jail. These mass arrests 
greatly affected local economies and family structures. As 
Gramsci 's 'Prison Notebooks' themselves demonstrate, there 
is no better place than prison to develop a nuanced under-
standing of hegemony. According to many villagers, those 
who had spent time in jail returned with a much sharper 
sense of the class struggle in which they were engaged and 
began spreading Communist rhetoric in the area , effectively 
forming a new generation of 'organic intellectuals.' 
CONCLUSION: THE POWER OF PRACTICAL IDEOLOGY 
By early 2001 , Piskar was a rr.gional Maoist base, or adhar 
ilaka, and it had even become a show village where Maoist 
propagandists took foreign reporters42 The village's history 
had produced a heightened political consciousness, which 
nieant that when the Maoists did arrive on the scene , their 
ideology was seen to be essentially congruent with the exist-
ing agendas of many villagers. 
Gramsci's notion of "practica l ideology" is central to my 
argument here . As Christina Buci-Glucksmann explains, 
"Practica l ideologies and modes of living and feeling have 
their roo ts in the economic base: the relation between civilta 
[civil society] and production is a pivotal point in Gramsci's 
whole problematic of capitalism, and of socialism too" (Buci-
Glucksmann 1980: 89). In the schema I propose for under-
standing the success of Maoism in Nepal, "practical ideology" 
refers to the concrete economic reforms, relevant to the daily 
lives of villagers, which undergird the Maoist agenda. Practi-
cal ideology is the necessary complement to "theoretical ideol-
ogy," a category which contains both abstract notions of class 
struggle and revolution articulated in elite language, and the 
international trajectory of Maoism as a historical force. The 
important point is that "practical 
ideology" is just as ideological, or 
hegemonic, as "theoretical ideolo-
gy," and therefore can play an equal, 
if not superior, role in fostering lo-
cal political consciousness. Both 
are necessary for the long-term suc-
cess of any hegemonic movement; 
their relationship might b e seen as 
analagous to the relationship that 
Gramsci posits between "sponta-
PHom: SARA SHNEIDER~ I AN neity" and "conscious leadership." 
Spontaneity is the unpremeditated 
political action of the masses, while "conscious leadership" 
refers to the premeditated st rategies of educated leaders. For 
Gramsci, "the union of 'spontaneity' and 'conscious leader-
ship,' or 'discipline ,' is the real political action of subaltern 
classes, since it is mass politics and not simply an adventure 
of groups who address themselves to the mass.'43 Similarly, 
recognizing the distinctive qualities that come together in 
the union of "practical ideology" and "theoretical ideology" 
helps to bridge the gap often perceived between Maoist in-
tellectual leadership and grassroots practice . In other words, 
although the villagers of Piskar may have remained unaware 
of the political complexities of the movement's national goals, 
let alone its international and historica l context, they were 
attracted by Maoist rhetoric and action surrounding concrete 
issues such as land reform, bringing exploitative landowners 
to justice, driving out the police, and claiming political power 
for the disenfranchised. Thangmi inhabitants of Piskar and 
the surrounding areas repeatedly stated that 1vlaoism is about 
"bringing justice to the exploiters." The argument that most 
'Maoist' fighters didn't understand Maoist theoretical ideology 
and therefore joined simply out of fear or desire for future 
grandeur-' false consciousness'-begins to falter if we ac-
knowledge the very profound level at which people like those 
whom experienced the Piskar dramas can understand Maoist 
practical ideology. In 1984 such villagers understood democ-
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racy in the very same way, so that some years later they knew 
precisely when the system had failed to fulfil its ideological 
promises. For many who were di sillusioned by factionali zed 
political movements and empty party promises, the perceived 
objectives of the lvlaoist movement made much sense. There 
was little to gain by sitting it out, and even less to lose by 
joining. 
Refocusing on the importance of practical ideology in the 
Nepali context provokes a necessarily brief discussion of 
the relationship between Nepali Maoism and other forms of 
]'v!aoism worldwide. Part of the argument that ascribes false 
consciousness to those Nepalis participating in the !v!aoist 
movement focuses on their general lack of understanding of 
international Maoist history and its shocking results, particu-
larly in China. The argument goes that if Nepalis sympathetic 
to the lV!aoist cause had any historical knowledge of the out-
comes of those earlier incarnations of lvlaoism, they would be 
sensible enough to realize that the J:vlaoist project was deeply 
flawed. Furthermore, it is only on account of their ignorance 
and failure to grasp the impossibility of a hegemonic success 
through Maoism that they continue to support the move-
ment. I argue instead that many of those participating in the 
]'v!aoist movement are working with full consciousness of its 
practical ideology which articulates local needs and taps into 
pre-existing frustrations. 
In the long run, however, practical ideology alone cannot 
provide an adequate framework for building a truly egalitar-
ian and functional civil society in Nepal. It is only a matter 
of time until the same type of disaffection that Piskar's villag-
ers felt with democracy becomes prevalent with Maoism44 
In james Scott's words, "The revolution, when and if it does 
come, may eliminate many of the ·worst evils of the ancient 
regime, but it is rarely if ever the end of peasant resistance. 
For the radical elites who capture the state are likely to have 
different goals in mind than their erstwhile peasant sup-
porters."45 As consciousness continues to evolve, the people 
of Piskar will find new means of resistance to both Maoist 
and state hegemony. Nepal's crisis will continue to unfold , 
and only by engaging in the specificity of local historical and 
political discourses about it will we come to understand the 
crisis in its entirety. 
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1 This article draws upon research conducted in Nepal while on a 
Fulbright Fellowship in 1999-2000. I wou ld like to thank Kathryn 
March, David Holmberg, Jakob Rigi , Shambhu Oja, Matt Rothwell, 
and especially judith Pettigrew and Mark Turin for their contri-
butions to this paper. Thanks are also clue to John Metz, Barbara 
Brower, and the other participants of the pre-conference 'War on 
Terrorism, War as Terrorism' held at the 31st Madison South Asian 
Conference in October 2002. Finally, I thank the people of Piskar 
and the larger Thangmi community in Sindhupalcok and Dolakha. 
2 By 'early phases' I refer to the period before the November 2001 
imposi tion of a State of Emergency by the Nepali government. Re-
search for this paper was conducted before that date. Conditions 
in Nepal h ave evolved extensively since that time, so I use the past 
tense to describe the ethnographic situation as I encountered it 
between November 1998 and September 2001. In that sense, this 
article is a period piece, and I have not attempted to update it to 
renect the emerging situation of mid 2004. The assertions I make in 
this paper are therefore as accurate as possible for the stated period. 
However, I make no claim that attitudes among the academic com-
munity, in Piskar, or elsewhere in Nepal remain the same at the time 
of publicat ion. 
3 To date there is only a smattering of published academic articles 
related to the subj ect (Nickson 1992; de Sales 2000; Gautam et al. 
2001). Several new volumes that appeared in 2003 begin to fill this 
gap (see Gellner 2003; Hutt 2004; Karki and Seddon 2003; Thapa 
2003b, 2003c). 
4 In taking this approach, l offer a respectful nod towards Ranajit 
Guha's seminal work on peasant insurgency in colonial India (1999 
V IOLENT H ISTORIES AND PoLITICAL CoNSCIOUSNESs / Shneiderman 47 
[1983]) . Although Nepal's 1vlaoist movement must be considered on 
its own terms, we would do well to consider the structural simi-
larities between the colonial Indian peasant insurgencies Guha de-
scr ibes and the current situation in Nepal. Guha's category of 'rebel 
consciousness' is particularly relevant , and the larger question beg-
ging attention is why such potentially useful work emanating from 
the Subaltern Studies School in general has not yet been adequately 
· incorporated into contemporary work on Nepal. led: Though see 
Richard Bownas' paper in this volume! 
5 Buci-Gluckmann (1980:95) 
6 cf. Fardon (1990) 
7 cf. Pfaff-Czarnecka (2004) 
Scott (1985: 37) 
9 Ibid. 
10 The Thangmi, known as 'Thami' in Nepa li , are an ethnic group 
of about 40,000 who speak a Tibeto-Burman language. They are one 
of the poorest and least represented ethnic groups in Nepal within 
political, developmental, and scholarly discourses . 
11 See Shneiderman and Turin (2004) for a detailed account of 
this moment in local history. 
12 cf. Pieke (1995) 
13 cf. Hacchethu (2003); Onta (2003); Roka (2001); Thapa (2003a; 
2003c) 
14 Gautam, Banskota and Manchanda's discussion of women's 
agency within the Maoist movement is a notable exception (2001). 
Substantial new work focusing on the question of agency is appear-
ing just as this artic le goes to press. In particular see Pettigrew's 
analysis of youth participation in the movement (2003b) and Shar-
ma and Prasain's overview of women's participation (2003). 
15 de Sales (2000: 41) 
16 Moynihan (2002: A2l) 
17 Anonymous, from an online discussion group (September 
2002) 
18 I am grateful to Kathryn March for pointing out that those 
villagers who remain 'non-aligned' make an equally weighty and 
agentive choice as those who join the Maoists or other political par-
ties. In order to consider the broader complex of political agency 
in rural Nepal in a way that moves beyond the contingencies of 
the Maoist movement , we will need to consider how and why those 
who make the choice to remain politically unaffiliated manage to 
maintain that status. 
19 Pettigrew (2003a) [eel: and in this volume] 
20 Luitel (2003) 
21 Popham (2001); Anonymous (2001) 
22 See Shneidennan and Turin (2004) for a detailed description of 
the establishment of the Dolakha jan sarkar. 
48 
23 Thapa (2001: 9) 
24 There is an extensive existing literature on social inequality 
in Nepa l which provides a greater Lime-depth and regional breadth 
to the hi storical narrative presented here. A thorough di scussion 
of these sources is beyond the scope of the current paper. For an 
account of the structural hierarchies of the caste system see Hofer 
(1979); for an overview of the military conquests th at led to con-
temporary settlement patterns see Pradhan (1991) and Stiller; and 
for analyses of land-based class structures see Caplan (1970) and 
Regmi (1978a, 1978b) 
25 Niko Pragatisil Thami Samaj [hereafter NPTS I (2054); Thami 
Bhasa Tatha Sanskriti Utthan Kendra [hereafter TBTSUK] (2056) 
26 Amnesty International (1987) 
27 Chand s reinstatement as Prime Minister by King Gyanendra 
from October 2002 to May 2003 only adds to the odd sense of deja 
vu in Piskar that regardless of how much they agitate, the system 
never changes. 
28 cf. Holmberg (2000); Pfaff-Czarnecka (1996) 
29 Amnesty International (1987); INSEC (1985) 
30 Amnesty International (1987: 15) 
31 TBTSUK (2056: 65). All translations from Nepali are mine, and 
I bear responsibility for any errors. 
32 Cammett (1967: 199) 
33 A ropani is a standard Nepali measurement equivalent to 5476 
square feet. 
34 ICDM (1999) 
35 Kurtz (1996: 108) 
36 NPTS (1997: 68) 
37 Anonymous villager's account, as cited in Shneiderman and 
Turin (2004) 
38 TBTSUK (2056: 65) 
39 TBTSUK (2056 68) 
40 NPTS (2054: 68). 
41 
htm 
http://www. insof.org/politics/130299 _ 40demands_Maoist. 
42 Liu and Roberts (2001) 
43 Gramsci, as cited in Cammett (1967: 199) 
44 As of late 2003, there is anecdotal ev idence that this may have 
already begun to happen, but I do not yet have detailed data to sup-
port this proposition. 
45 Scott (1985: 302) 
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